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Canario: De Minimis Defense in Copyright Law

THE DE MINIMIS DEFENSE IN SOUND RECORDINGS: HOW A
TRIVIAL CLAIM LEADS TO A BIG QUESTION
Elvin Canario*
I.

INTRODUCTION

With regard to copyright, James Madison said in 1788 “[t]he
utility of this power will scarcely be questioned.”1 If here today, it is
safe to say, Madison would be shocked at the number of controversies
and questions surrounding this “power.” With the emergence of
technology, these controversies have only become more convoluted.2
For example, courts have conflicting viewpoints on what rights are
protected by copyright.3 It was not until the 1970s that sound
recordings were brought into the ambit of copyright protections.4
Since then, there has been, and continues to be, much debate in this
area of law.5 Copyright law surrounding sound recordings has become
more relevant because of advancements and progressions in musical
technology. This musical technology now permits sounds to be copied

* J.D. Candidate 2020, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. in Political
Science, Cum Laude, Stony Brook University, 2016. First and foremost, I would like to thank
God. I would also like to thank my wonderful family who give me my motivation to keep
trying my hardest every day. Finally, I would like to thank the remarkable personnel of Touro
Law, from our professors to our Law Review staff, to just speaking with friends before class;
everyone here has, in some way, helped to contribute to the accomplishment of this Note.
1 James Madison, Federalist, No. 43, 288, FOUNDERS CONST., Jan. 23, 1788, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s7.html.
2 Nicole Lieberman, Un-Blurring Substantial Similarity: Aesthetic Judgments and
Romantic Authorship in Music Copyright Law, 6 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 91, 125
(2016).
3 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005); VMG Salsoul,
LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).
4 Lieberman, supra note 2, at 99.
5 See generally Marsha A. Willis, Unauthorized Digital Sound Sampling, the Taking of a
Constitutional Right, 17 S.U. L. REV. 309 (1990).
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and replayed at the push of a button, allowing for many songs and other
sounds that musicians or producers have created to easily be pirated.6
Regarding copyright protection of sound recordings, questions
remain as to the defenses that are available to alleged infringers when
“sampling” technology is used.7 The sound recording industry defines
sampling as, “taking a snippet of a song and repurposing it.”8 After a
plaintiff establishes the initial burden of proving an actual copying of
his work,9 the applicable defenses differ depending on the federal
district court in which the suit is brought.10 If a court was in a district
that adopts the bright-line rule, which says that any form of concededto copying of a sound recording requires a license, then fair use will
arguably be the only viable defense.11 However, if the suit is brought
in a district which has considered certain types of sampling trivial, then
the de minimis defense will be available.12
This Note explores the idea that courts should apply the brightline rule,13 allowing for fair use14 as the only reasonable defense for
conceded-to sampling of sound recordings, until Congress takes an
alternative approach. Section II provides definitions and history of key
terms and laws that will be used throughout this Note. Section III
explains the position of the Sixth Circuit, which generally finds that
samplers of sound recordings should not be allowed to use the de
minimis defense. Contrarily, Section IV discusses the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis in favor of such a defense. Section V discusses possible
unforeseen complications that a de minimis exception for sampling

6

See Bruce J. McGiverin, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: Protecting
Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1723, 1723 (1987)
(“digital sound sampling[‘s] . . . current use in the music industry poses a threat both to the
value of musicians’ recorded work and to their professional identities.”).
7 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792; see also VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 871.
8 Digital Music Sampling: Creativity or Criminality?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, INC., (Jan. 28,
2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/28/133306353/Digital-Music-SamplingCreativity-Or-Criminality.
9 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
10 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792; see also VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 871.
11 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805 (“These conclusions require us to reverse the entry of
summary judgment entered . . . . Since the district judge found no infringement, there was no
necessity to consider the affirmative defense of ‘fair use.’ On remand, the trial judge is free
to consider this defense and we express no opinion on its applicability to these facts.”).
12 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 871 (allowing the de minimis defense in sound recording
infringement cases).
13 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792.
14 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss4/13

2

Canario: De Minimis Defense in Copyright Law

2018

DE MINIMIS DEFENSE IN COPYRIGHT LAW

1063

could bring about. Section V finishes with some possible resolutions
that courts could use until the circuit split is resolved.
II.

HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT AND RELEVANT DEFINITIONS

Copyright protections are derived directly from the United
States Constitution.15 As indicated in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of
the Constitution, the purpose of copyright law is “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”16 Accordingly, it is clear that Congress takes into
account two factors when legislating copyright law: (1) protecting
original works and (2) avoiding the stifling of creativity.17 The
Founding Fathers believed that creating laws that would punish people
for the unauthorized copying of another’s work would serve as a
deterrent and allow a creator to have assurances that his works would
not be stolen, which provides him with a limited monopoly to his
work.18 However, under narrow circumstances, unauthorized users of
the copyrighted work can use the work without legal implications by
arguing that such use was fair, which stems back to the common law
and is now codified.19 The purpose of this fair use defense was and
continues to be to prevent overprotection of copyrights, encompassing
the idea that not allowing anyone to use any work for any purpose goes
against the very reason why Congress created the copyright laws with
its legislative power granted by the Constitution.20
15

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
Id.
17 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800.
18 See Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS’N RES. LIBR.,
http://www.arl.org/focus-areas/copyright-ip/2486-copyright-timeline#.WsFFpojwbIU (last
visited Nov. 14, 2018) (“The law was meant to provide an incentive to authors, artists, and
scientists to create original works by providing creators with a monopoly.”).
19 See Martine Courant Rife, The Fair Use Doctrine: History, Application, and Implications
for (New Media) Writing Teachers, 24 COMPUTERS & COMPOSITIONS 154, 158 (2007),
https://msu.edu/~mcgrat71/Writing/Fair_Use_Rife.pdf (“Section 107, as part of the 1976
Copyright Act, defines fair use and sets forth what is commonly known as the four-factor test.
Previous to this legislation, fair use was not clearly defined in any code—but was defined
through extrapolating holdings and discussions in U.S. Case Law . . . .”); see also Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202
(2d Cir. 2015)
20 Cf. Fair Use, STAN. U. LIBR., https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/ (last visited
Nov. 14, 2018) (“Fair use is a copyright principle based on the belief that the public is entitled
to freely use portions of copyrighted materials for purposes of commentary and criticism. For
16
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The United States Supreme Court has established a two-part
test to determine whether copyright infringement has occurred. The
test includes: (1) establishment of ownership of a valid copyright, and
(2) the copying of constituent elements of the work that are considered
to be original to the copyright holder.21 If there is no direct evidence
of copying, the plaintiff can prove the second element through
circumstantial evidence by a showing of substantial similarity between
the two works at issue.22
The copyright law for sound recordings is a relatively new area
in the field of copyright, the protections of such sound recordings
becoming codified in the 1970s.23 17 U.S.C. § 114 specifically
provides for copyright protections of sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. §
114(b) provides for the exclusive rights and limitations given to
copyright holders of sound recordings.24 The disagreements between
example, if you wish to criticize a novelist, you should have the freedom to quote a portion of
the novelist’s work without asking permission. Absent this freedom, copyright owners could
stifle any negative comments about their work.”); see also ALAN LATMAN, 12 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT I (1958).
21 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
22 Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 2017).
23 Lieberman, supra note 2, at 99. For background on why sound recordings were not
protected until this time, see infra text accompanying notes 86-94.
24 17 U.S.C. § 114 provides:
(a) The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording
are limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section
106, and do not include any right of performance under section 106(4).
(b) The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording
under clause (1) of section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the sound
recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or indirectly
recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording. The exclusive right of
the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (2) of section
106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in which the actual
sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise
altered in sequence or quality. The exclusive rights of the owner of
copyright in a sound recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do
not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though
such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.
The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
clauses (1), (2), and (3) of section 106 do not apply to sound recordings
included in educational television and radio programs (as defined in
section 397 of title 47) distributed or transmitted by or through public
broadcasting entities (as defined by section 118(f)): Provided, That copies
or phonorecords of said programs are not commercially distributed by or
through public broadcasting entities to the general public.
17 U.S.C. §114 (2018) (emphasis in original).
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the Sixth and Ninth Circuits mainly revolve around this portion of the
statute and its interpretations, particularly regarding the protections it
affords artists using the sampling technique.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines sampling as “[t]he process of
taking a small portion of a sound recording and digitally manipulating
it as part of a new recording.”25 Others have defined the technique a
bit more passionately, as one author describes:
To sample is to cut up: mine the archive; steal to
subvert; recycle footage; assist a readymade;
appropriate invention; elevate the fragment; drift
though sequences of signs . . . question the act of
watching . . . raise the dead . . . become a curator; open
up the cultural database . . . eviscerate the author;
materialize associative actions.26
A person who engages in the process of sampling can achieve
sampling through a variety of means;27 a common method used to
sample is through a synthesizer.28 This process requires just the touch
of a button to incorporate the sampled sound into the new work,29
saving the sampler time and money of having to re-record a piece of
music he wants to use.30
Technological innovations eventually prompted Congress to
make amendments to existing copyright law to give these new forms
of intellectual property their own distinct protections.31 However,
there are currently only two circuits courts that have addressed the
issue of whether a sampler can use the de minimis doctrine as an

Sampling, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
READINGS IN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 277 (Steve Greenfield & Guy Osborn eds.,
2006) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
27 Francesco Di Cosmo, Return of the De Minimis Exception in Digital Music Sampling:
The 9th Circuit’s Recent Holding in VMG Salsoul Improves Upon the 6th Circuit’s Holding
in Bridgeport, But Raises Questions of its Own, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 227 (2017).
28 McGiverin, supra note 6.
29 McGiverin, supra note 6, at 1725.
30 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 n.14 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“Thus sampling of records . . . allows a producer of music to save money (by not hiring a
musician) without sacrificing the sound and phrasing of a live musician in the song.”); see also
id. at 802 n.7.
31 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660;
see also Willis, supra note 5, at 323.
25
26
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affirmative defense against infringement claims for sampled sound
recordings.32
De minimis is short for the Latin phrase de minimis non curat
lex, which translates to “[t]he law does not concern itself with trifles.”33
This doctrine holds that if a defendant can prove that the allegations or
harms alleged by the plaintiff are trivial, this fact alone stands as an
affirmative defense to the charge.34 Since the Supreme Court’s
introduction of the de minimis standard in 1796,35 there are now many
fields of law that apply this doctrine, such as taxation, labor unions,
and voter disenfranchisement.36 The term de minimis was used in
copyright disputes as early as 1847.37 In analyzing the de minimis
standard in copyright law, the courts tend to focus on whether the
copied portion was “substantial” enough to constitute actual copying
of a protected work.38 Accordingly, the courts have found that the de
minimis standard applied in cases involving the copying of
32 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792; VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir.
2016). Although no other circuit court has decided on this exact issue, there are courts that
have made rulings on digital sampling, namely courts in the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth
Circuits. See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-27, No. 07-162-B-W, 2008 WL 222283, at
*1 (D. Me. Jan. 25, 2008), aff’d, 584 F. Supp. 2d 240 (D. Me. 2008); Poindexter v. EMI Record
Grp. Inc., No. 11 CIV. 559(LTS)(JLC), 2012 WL 1027639 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2012);
Curington v. UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-890, 2011 WL 3568278 (M.D.N.C. Aug.
12, 2011), aff’d, 468 F. App’x 304 (4th Cir. 2012); Batiste v. Island Records Inc., 179 F.3d
217 (5th Cir. 1999).
33 De Minimis Non Curat Lex, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
34 Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998) (“To establish
that the infringement of a copyright is de minimis, and therefore not actionable, the alleged
infringer must demonstrate that the copying of the protected material is so trivial as to fall
below the quantitative threshold of substantial similarity, which is always a required element
of actionable copying.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
35 Jeffrey Brown, How Much Is Too Much? The Application of the De Minimis Doctrine to
the Fourth Amendment, 82 MISS. L.J. 1097, 1099 (2013).
36 Id. at 1100-02.
37 Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511, 520 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 17,323) (“A novelty in
arrangement, especially so trifling as this, without any new material connected with it, seemed
to him, and still seems to him to be, of questionable sufficiency to be protected by a copyright.
The master seemed to be of the same opinion, on the ground ‘De minimis non curat lex.’
Slight changes, like the use of chapters and verses, where none existed before, as some
hundreds of years ago in the Bible, or the introduction of punctuation, which is said not now
to exist generally in acts of parliament, or the use of sections instead of pages, which in modern
times is reviving only an ancient practice, would all have higher claims to novelty and
usefulness, than merely transferring the same material from one page at the end to another in
the central part of a book, as here.”).
38 See Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 215; see also Gottlieb Dev. LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
590 F. Supp. 2d 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70
(2d Cir. 1997); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
1998).
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photographs,39 pinball machines40 in the background of movies,
television programs41 and books; in each of these cases, the de minimis
defense prevailed and, consequently, prevented recovery.42
III.

SAMPLING AND COPYRIGHT AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT

The most prominent case stemming from the Sixth Circuit
regarding sampling is Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films.43 In
this case, the issue before the court was whether a three-note
combination from a solo guitar, sampled from the sound recording
“Get Off Your Ass and Jam,” constituted copyright infringement.44
The sample was first inserted in the song “100 Miles and Runnin’,”
which was subsequently included on the sound track of the defendant’s
movie “I Got The Hook Up.”45 The district court undertook the de
minimis analysis and determined that, although the defendant did not
deny using the plaintiff’s sampled work, the portion was relatively
unsubstantial and not enough to constitute infringement.46 However,
the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, determining
that the district court’s analysis was erroneous.47 The Sixth Circuit
held that, under its interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 114, a copyright holder
is the only person that can legally sample from his work. Thus, the de
minimis inquiry is not necessary when a defendant has sampled a
copyrighted sound recording because no amount of the work could
legally be sampled without the copyright holder’s authorization.48
With this holding, the Sixth Circuit created a bright-line rule by
eliminating the de minimis inquiry49 for digital sampling of copyright
protected sound recordings; if anyone wanted to sample any amount of
a protected sound recording, he would need to get a license.50 The
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 215.
Gottlieb, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 70.
Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 132.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id. at 797.
Id. at 798.
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801-02.
And, thus, the de minimis defense.
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801.
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Sixth Circuit believed this new bright-line rule would clarify the
judicial approach to cases involving sampling infringement.51
A.

The Sixth Circuit’s Statutory Interpretation of 17
U.S.C. § 114(b)

The Sixth Circuit did not analyze the statute’s legislative
history because digital sampling had not yet been created when
Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).52 Instead, the court did a “literal
reading”53 of the statute and discussed why sound recordings needed
their own copyright protections.54 The court first mentioned that
Congress expressed a need to amend the statute because it wanted to
prevent the pirating of sound recordings, which was increasing with
technological advancements.55 The court then looked at the plain
meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 114 (b) and determined that “the world at large
is free to imitate or simulate the creative work fixed in the recording
so long as an actual copy of the sound recording itself is not made.”56
From this understanding, the court boiled down the question of
sampling a sound recording to, “[i]f you cannot pirate the whole sound
recording, can you ‘lift’ or ‘sample’ something less than the whole?”57
The court held in the negative.58
1.

The Sixth Circuit’s Plain Meaning
Interpretation of 17 U.S.C § 114(b)

The Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport began its plain meaning
analysis focusing on 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).59 It determined that the
language of the statute gave the owner of a copyright the exclusive
right to sample his own recording.60 The court held that sampling
constituted a version of a derivative work61 and, because section 114(b)
51

Id. at 799.
See id. at 805.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 800.
55 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800.
56 Id.
57
Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801.
61 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
52
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granted the exclusive right to prepare a derivative work, copyright
holders had that same exclusive right in sampling their own work.62
The Sixth Circuit based its decision on the fact that, prior to the
amendments, the word “entirely” was not included in the language of
the statute.63 An author creates a derivative work if the new work
contains a sample from one of his original works, and because this new
derivative work does not consist “entirely of independent fixation of
other sounds,” his exclusive right to prepare such derivative works
applies.64
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that, because Congress explicitly
inserted the word “entirely” into section 114(b), its intent was for
future techniques, like sampling, to satisfy the requirement.65 Any
amount of an author’s protected work that is incorporated into another
work constitutes a derivative of the protected work and only the
copyright holder is authorized to make such a work because he has the
exclusive right to prepare derivative works of his sound recordings in
accordance with the statute.66 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit reasoned
that the reverse also holds true in which a copyright holder cannot
extend his rights in a particular sound recording to a new work if the
new work consisted “entirely” of other independent sounds.67 Without
encompassing any of the actual fixed sounds from his original sound
recording, the new work could not be considered a derivative and, thus,
would not be protected.68 Further, the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works applies to sampling because sampling is considered a
derivative work when incorporating actual sounds from a protected
work into a new work, and this new derivative work is not entirely

motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”); Id. § 106(2) (2018) (
“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights . . . to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”).
62 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800-01 n.10.
63 Id. at 800-01 (“The significance of this provision is amplified by the fact that the
Copyright Act of 1976 added the word ‘entirely’ to this language. Compare Sound Recording
Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (Oct. 15, 1971)”).
64 See id. at 800-01 n.10 (first emphasis in original).
65 See id. at 800-01.
66 See id.
67 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800.
68 See id. at 800-01.
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independent of actual protected sounds.69 Thus, the court held that “a
sound recording owner has the exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own
recoding.”70
The Sixth Circuit’s determination that sampling constitutes an
instance where sounds from a sound recording are either “rearranged,
remixed or otherwise altered,”71 thus allowing for their protection
under 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) as a derivative work,72 is supportable.
Tunecore.com is a prominent website that deals with the licensing and
the selling of music.73 In an article posted on its website, professor and
former president of Rykodisc record label, George Howard, said:
[B]ecause a sample is a derivative work, you cannot
sample someone else’s copyrighted work without
permission.
Note that there are actually often two copyrights that
must be addressed when a work is sampled (and thus
two copyright holders you must get permission from in
order to avoid infringing):
The copyright to the song itself [and] the copyright to
the version of the song (i.e. the master)
…
Should they not reject the request outright, they will
negotiate with you to attempt to come to terms allowing
your creation of a derivative work. Unlike mechanicals
there’s no statutory maximum rate for samples, so
publishers and master holders will get everything they
can—including the rights to the copyright of the song
that is using their sample—in the negotiations.
A lesser-known approach to sampling is often referred
to as a “replay.” This is where a derivative work is
69

See id. at 800-01 n.10.
Id. at 800-01 (emphasis added).
71 See id. at 800-01 n.10; 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2018).
72 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800-01 n.10; 17 U.S.C. § 114.
73 Ogden Payne, What Tunecore’s $1B In Revenue Means For Independent Musicians
Worldwide, FORBES (June 29, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ogdenpayne/
2017/06/29/what-tunecores-1b-in-revenue-means-for-independent-musicians-worldwide/#5b
445e1460b0 (“TuneCore is nearing $1 billion in revenue for its artists. As of May 31, artists
and bands around the world have earned over $920 million collectively. To reach their goal
ahead of their projected date in October, the company has launched the Billion Dollar Club, a
campaign that allows users to upload a single for worldwide distribution to over 160 digital
stores (Spotify, Apple Music, Tidal and the like) for free, for a limited time.”).
70
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created and used as part of another work via a reperformance/re-recording of a piece of the original
work.
…
It cuts both ways, of course, should someone want to
sample your copyrighted work, he or she will have to
negotiate a deal with you in order to do so, or risk you
suing them for infringing upon your exclusive right to
create derivative works.74
The author then gives a warning against de minimis sampling
stating, “[t]here is no clear standard for what is considered de minimis
usage, and thus [a creator] is at risk if [he] misappropriate[s] any
copyrighted material and create[s] a derivative work in the form of a
sample in [his] own composition.”75 This determination by an
influential voice in the industry supports the same finding by the Sixth
Circuit in Bridgeport: sampling a sound recording creates a derivative
work. Therefore, creating a work that uses samples constitutes the
making of a derivative work, which is a right that is only afforded to
the copyright holder of the sound recording as per 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).76
Lastly, in the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976,
the House Judiciary Committee said that, “to constitute a violation of
section 106(2),77 the infringing work must incorporate a portion of the
copyrighted work in some form.”78 This language suggests that
sampling would be a violation of the exclusive right to prepare a
derivative work because the very meaning of sampling is to
incorporate a portion of a copyrighted work, in some form, into a new
work. Perhaps the legislative history also supports the Sixth Circuit’s
and music industries’ finding that sampling can and should be

74

George Howard, Understanding Sampling, Cover Sounds & Derivative Work, TUNECORE
(Oct. 7, 2010), https://ca.tunecore.com/blog/2010/10/understanding-sampling-cover-songsderivative-work.html (emphasis added).
75 Id. (emphasis added) (“Don’t be confused with respect to misinformation regarding the
right to use small amounts of another’s copyrighted work in your composition—i.e. a ‘short’
sample—without legal risk.”).
76 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
77 17 U.S.C § 106(2) (2010) (stating “to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work”).
78 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675
(emphasis added).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 4 [2018], Art. 13

1072

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

considered a derivative work and, as such, is worthy of the protections
given to sound recording copyright holders under 17 U.S.C § 114 (b).79
2.

Piracy of Sound Recordings and How “de
minimis” Sampling Could Contribute

The Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport wrote:
There are probably any number of reasons why the
decision was made by Congress to treat a sound
recording differently from a book even though both are
the medium in which an original work is fixed rather
than the creation itself. None the least of them certainly
were advances in technology which made the
“pirating” of sound recordings an easy task. The
balance that was struck was to give sound recording
copyright holders the exclusive right “to duplicate the
sound recording in the form of phonorecords or copies
that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds
fixed in the recording.” 17 U.S.C. § 114(b). . . . If you
cannot pirate the whole sound recording, can you “lift”
or “sample” something less than the whole.80
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)
to curtail pirating, or copying, of small portions of a whole sound
recordings.81
Black’s Law Dictionary defines piracy as “[t]he unauthorized
and illegal reproduction or distribution of materials protected by
copyright.”82 It was argued in an article,83 relied upon by the court in
Bridgeport, that unauthorized sampling falls under piracy law.84 The
author cited to testimony of a representative of the Recording Industry
79 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792; Howard, supra note 74; but see Jennifer R. R. Mueller, All
Mixed Up: Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films and De Minimis Digital Sampling, 81 IND.
L.J. 435, 451 (2006) (“Thus, ‘sampling’ could almost never create a derivative work.”).
80 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800 (emphasis added).
81 See id.
82 Piracy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
83 Jeffrey R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling, Copyright Law and the American Music
Industry: Piracy or Just A Bad “Rap”?, 37 LOY. L. REV. 879 (1992).
84 Id. at 896-97; Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801 n.13; see also VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone,
824 F.3d 871, 889 (9th Cir. 2016) (Silverman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he very nature of digital
sampling makes a de minimis analysis inapplicable, since sampling or pirating necessarily
involves copying a fixed performance.” (emphasis added)).
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Association of America, given before a Senate committee, in which
the representative explained how digital sampling was cutting into
sales, employees were not paid, and investments and jobs would be at
risk.85 Piracy in sound recordings has been, and is still, an acute
problem in this country. The author of this Note argues that use of the
de minimis defense in digital sampling cases can actually contribute to
the problem of sound recording piracy.
Piracy has long been a problem in copyright, but it was not until
the 1970s that Congress codified protection for sound recordings.86 In
the legislative history for Public Law 92-140, which created the limited
copyright in sound recording,87 Congress explicitly reported on the
need for reform because pirates were exploiting a loophole in the
current law.88 The pre-1971 law only protected the owners of
copyright in musical works and not sound recordings, “as a result, [if
record pirates could] satisfy the claim of the owner of the musical
copyright,” they would then be able to pirate the sound recordings of
musical compositions or other protected sounds, without violating
federal copyright law.89 Congress went on to say that copying of
sounding recordings was becoming widespread and intolerable, further
indicating that the piracy activity in this area was at an annual volume
in excess of $100 million.90 Moreover, Congress indicated that sound
recording piracy was negatively affecting the incomes of three
groups91 by: (1) “depriving legitimate manufacturers of substantial
income;”92 (2) “denying preforming artists and musicians of royalties
and contributions to pension and welfare funds;”93 which had the effect
of causing (3) “Federal and State governments [to lose] tax
revenues.”94
Looking at more contemporary numbers of the economic
damage caused by sound recording, one can better understand why
85

Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801 n.13; Houle, supra note 83, at 896-97.
Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (“To amend title
17 of the United States Code to provide for the creation of a limited copyright in sound
recordings for the purpose of protecting against unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound
recording, and for other purposes.”).
87 Id.
88 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567.
89
See id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. (emphasis added).
93 H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (emphasis added).
94 Id.
86
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Congress passed the law in 1971. Even today, Congress’s intuition
about the need to prevent sound recording piracy as much as possible
continues to be warranted. In 2007, a published report presented the
horrific problem of sound recording piracy.95 The report stated:
The true cost of sound recording piracy far exceeds its
impact on U.S. producers and distributors of sound
recordings. Piracy harms not only the owners of
intellectual property but also U.S. consumers and
taxpayers.
Specifically, the analysis demonstrates that:
(a) As a consequence of global and U.S.-based
piracy of sound recordings, the U.S. economy
loses $12.5 billion in total output annually.
Output includes revenue and related measures
of economic performance.
(b) As a result of sound recording piracy, the
U.S. economy loses 71,060 jobs. Of this
amount, 26,860 jobs would have been added in
the sound recording industry or in downstream
retail industries, while 44,200 jobs would have
been added in other U.S. industries.
(c) Because of sound recording piracy, U.S.
workers lose $2.7 billion in earnings annually.
Of this total, $1.1 billion would have been
earned by workers in the sound recording
industry or in downstream retail industries
while $1.6 billion would have been earned by
workers in other U.S. industries.
(d) As a consequence of piracy, U.S. federal,
state and local governments lose a minimum of
$422 million in tax revenues annually. Of this
amount, $291 million represents lost personal
income taxes while $131 million is lost
corporate income and production taxes.

95

Stephen E. Siwek, The True Cost of Sound Recording Piracy to the U.S. Economy, INST.
i, Aug. 2007, http://www.ipi.org/docLib/20120515_SoundRecord
ingPiracy.pdf.
FOR POL’Y INNOVATION, at
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As policy makers turn their attention to the viability of
the U.S. economy in the global marketplace, it seems
obvious that the problem of music piracy should be
afforded a high place on the policy agenda in coming
years.96
These numbers suggest that the current laws are still unable to
fully handle the piracy issue. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling
against de minimis sampling suggests that it did not want to exacerbate
these economic losses. As the court later noted, “[t]o properly sort out
this type of problem with its complex technical and business overtones,
one needs the type of investigative resources as well as the ability to
hold hearings that is possessed by Congress.”97 Thus, with the current
state of the law, if courts have difficulty deciding whether a sample is
truly an infringement because of the complexities involved in making
such a determination, then courts should not allow small or de minimis
amounts of conceded-to sampling. The statistics above show that
piracy of sound recordings imposes significant costs on the United
States economy and provides a strong reason for stricter laws for sound
recordings.98
Finally, the author of this Note does not oppose the use of
sampling but rather advocates for uniform, applicable laws. In fact, it
has been the opinion of experts in the field that “the industry can
potentially reverse the effects of online audio piracy by providing more
legal and efficient sampling techniques that consumers could use.”99
Therefore, if courts give copyright holders more protections, and
provide legal clarity to creators seeking to sample by the
implementation of such bright-line rules, such as the one created in
Bridgeport,100 courts may be able to prevent and reverse the effects of
sound recording/sampling piracy, which comports with Congress’s
goal of battling piracy in sound recordings.101

96

Id.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005).
98 See Siwek, supra note 95, at 7 (“The physical piracy loss estimate begins with the U.S.
losses from physical piracy that occur within the United States. As shown in Table 3, this
value is $335 million as per IFPI.”).
99 Rebuttal Expert Report of Dr. Stan J. Liebowitz, Arista Records, LLC v. Lime Wire,
LLC, 2010 WL 8510302 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.14, 2010) (No. 106CV05936) (first emphasis in
original).
100 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802.
101 H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567.
97
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The Sixth Circuit, after its legislative intent and plain meaning
analysis of 17 U.S.C. § 114, next analyzed the substantial similarity
inquiry and its application to the sampling of sound recordings. It
explained why this was the wrong test to apply to an infringement case
dealing with the sampling of a sound recording, notwithstanding the
occurrence of a substantial similarity finding for other certain types of
copyright cases, such as musical compositions.102
B.

The Substantial Similarity or de minimis Inquiry:
Not the Proper Test

In cases where a defendant admits to the copying of the
protected work but claims what was taken is so trivial that it should not
be actionable, the courts will engage in a de minimis inquiry, by using
the substantial similarity test, to determine if infringement has
occurred.103 The ordinary observer, or average audience, version104 of
102

Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801-02.
See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘[A] taking is considered
de minimis only if it is so meager and fragmentary that the average audience would not
recognize the appropriation.’ This observation reflects the relationship between the de minimis
maxim and the general test for substantial similarity, which also looks to the response of the
average audience, or ordinary observer, to determine whether a use is infringing” (citations
omitted)). Courts will also use the substantial similarity test to inquiry if a purported
infringement is de minimis even if there has been no admission to infringement. See infra text
accompanying notes 191-94.
104 The substantial similarity inquiry has long been established in copyright and scholars
have identified at least three different versions of the test. See Gabriel Godoy-Dalmau,
Substantial Similarity: Kohus Got it Right, 6 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 231,
243 (2017) (“Scholars have identified three discrete tests for substantial similarity in the U.S.:
the ordinary observer test, the extrinsic/intrinsic test, and the abstraction-filtration-comparison
test.”); see also Matthews v. Freedman, 157 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Courts have used
various formulas to isolate the protectible expression in the copyrighted work to determine
whether the alleged infringing work is ‘substantially similar’ to that protectible expression”).
Because the average audience test is the crux of the versions utilized by both the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits, the use of term “de minimis inquiry” or “substantial similarity test” throughout
this Note refers to this version of the substantial similarity test. See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at
801 n.10; see also VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2016); Mueller,
supra note 79, at 442 (“As the term ‘substantial similarity’ implies, the two works at issue
need not be identical. The most commonly articulated test looks at each work as a whole, and
considers ‘whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been
appropriated from the copyrighted work.’”); Mueller, supra note 79, at 442 n.62 (“The D.C.,
First, Second, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all apply the “average audience”
test in all cases. . . . The Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits use a “specialized audience” test in
cases regarding complex and technical works.”); Lieberman, supra note 2, at 114 (“Much like
the Second Circuit’s ordinary observer test, the [Ninth Circuit’s] intrinsic test is entirely
subjective and based on the ‘response of the ordinary reasonable person’ to the ‘total concept
and feel’ of a work, excluding expert testimony and dissection.” (footnote omitted)).
103
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the test asks “whether a [reasonable] lay observer would consider the
works as a whole substantially similar to one another.”105 Under this
version, in cases involving music, this is accomplished by listening to
both works in contention, and then asking if the factfinder could
definitively hear or notice the alleged appropriation.106 If the
appropriation cannot be recognized as originating from its alleged
source, then the copying element has not been satisfied, and the case
will not move forward.107
The court in Bridgeport determined, “[t]he analysis that is
appropriate for determining infringement of a musical composition
copyright, is not the analysis that is to be applied to determine
infringement of a sound recording.”108 The Sixth Circuit rejected the
lower court’s application of the substantial similarity test to a sound
recording because it was based on case law that used this test for
musical compositions.109 The Sixth Circuit provided two reasons why
a substantial similarity or de minimis inquiry should not “enter the
equation”110 in cases of sampling a sound recording. The first was
based on its interpretation of the statute’s plain meaning.111 The court
determined that this test had no application because determining if the
sampling was similar or substantial was irrelevant.112 This is because

105 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2009)
(“However, as have several of our sister circuits, we have also noted that it is appropriate to
modify this inquiry for situations in which a smaller fragment of a work has been copied
literally, but not the overall theme or concept—an approach referred to in the literature as
‘fragmented literal similarity.’ See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2] (rev. ed. 2009); see also Bridgeport, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410
F.3d 792, 797-98 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing the ‘fragmented literal similarity’ standard but
declining to apply it in cases of digital sampling).”).
106 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. CV 12-05967 BRO (CWx), 2013 WL 8600435,
at *12 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013), judgment entered No. CV 12-05967 BRO (CWx), 2013 WL
6983384 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016);
see also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 792 (6th Cir. 2005);
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004); Godoy-Dalmau, supra note 104, at
243 (“The question is whether the defendant took enough of the plaintiff’s work such that an
ordinary observer’s response to the work is to recognize that the defendant ‘appropriated
something which belongs to the plaintiff.’”).
107 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792; see also Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193; Godoy-Dalmau,
supra note 104, at 243.
108
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 798.
109 Id. (“Since the district court decision essentially tracked the analysis that is made if a
musical composition copyright were at issue, we depart from that analysis.”).
110 Id. at 801-02.
111 See id. at 801.
112 See id.
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the only person that is authorized to make a sample or derivative work
of a sound recording was the copyright holder, and, thus, only a
determination of whether the copying was intentional needs to be
explored—not whether an average audience could distinguish between
what was copied.113 Second, courts relying on case law dealing with
musical composition de minimis copying for analysis of sound
recordings are mistaken because of the inherent differences between
sound recordings and musical compositions. 114
The court ended with noting that a bright-line rule would help
the courts, as well as the music industry as a whole, by reducing the
unpredictability in piracy law for issues of undisputed, unauthorized
sampling of sound recordings.115 Moreover, courts, copyright holders,
and creators would all benefit from a bright-line rule because of the
difficulties and complexity with having to apply the “lay observer”
test.116
1.

Sound Recordings Versus Musical
Compositions

The Sixth Circuit determined that, although the substantial
similarity test is used for musical compositions, this same test should
not also be applied to sound recordings.117 The court held that sound
recording copyright holders seek protection of the actual sounds fixed
in their given medium, not the song or underlying musical
composition.118 The copyright holders of each work have distinct
interests, notwithstanding a musical composition’s overlap with a
sound recording in the same piece of work.119
113

See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801.
See id. at 801-02.
115 Id. at 802 n.15.
116 See id. (“This case also illustrates the kind of mental, musicological, and technological
gymnastics that would have to be employed if one were to adopt a de minimis or substantial
similarity analysis. The district judge did an excellent job of navigating these troubled waters,
but not without dint of great effort. When one considers that he has hundreds of other cases
all involving different samples from different songs, the value of a principled bright-line rule
becomes apparent. We would want to emphasize, however, that considerations of judicial
economy are not what drives this opinion. If any consideration of economy is involved it is
that of the music industry. As this case and other companion cases make clear, it would appear
to be cheaper to license than to litigate.” (emphasis in original)).
117 See id. at 798.
118 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802 (“For the sound recording copyright holder, it is not the
‘song’ but the sounds that are fixed in the medium of his choice.”).
119 See id.
114
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Sound recordings are unique because they capture the musical
composition with all the nuances. An artist adds his own style and
variations, or “performance elements,” while creating a sound
recording from a musical composition.120 As a result, these
performance elements are captured and are copyrighted in the sound
recording.121 The United States Copyright Office explains the
difference as:
Sound recordings often contain other separate
copyrightable creative works, such as songs, plays,
lectures, or readings. The copyright in a sound
recording covers the recording itself. It does not cover
the music, lyrics, words, or other underlying content
embodied in that recording. . . . The underlying music
and lyrics are a “musical work,” and a recording of an
artist performing that song is a “sound recording.”122
Moreover, the court in T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc.123 further
distinguished the two types of works, saying that “[a] sound recording
as copyrightable subject matter must be distinguished from the
copyrighted literary, musical or dramatic work . . . . The sound
recording is the aggregation of sounds captured in the recording while
the song or tangible medium of expression embodied in the recording
is the musical composition.”124 Also, the Southern District of New
York, in Poindexter v. EMI,125 mentioned that the unique elements in
a sound recording must be distinguished from the underlying
compositional elements.126
120

See BTE v. Bonnecaze, 43 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627-28 (E.D. La. 1999) (citing T.B. Harms
Co. v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575, 1577 n.1 (D.N.J. 1987)); see also Newton v.
Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[R]egardless of whether the average audience
might recognize the ‘Newton technique’ at work in the sampled sound recording, those
performance elements are beyond consideration in Newton’s claim for infringement of his
copyright in the underlying composition.”).
121 See BTE, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 627 (citing T.B. Harms Co., 655 F. Supp. at 1576 n.1) (“The
sound recording is the aggregation of sounds captured in the recording while the song or
tangible medium of expression embodied in the recording is the musical composition.”).
122 Copyright Registration for Sound Recordings, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., at 2, Sept. 2017,
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56.pdf.
123
T.B. Harms Co., 655 F. Supp. at 1575.
124 Id. at 1576 n.1. See also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5669. (emphasis added).
125 No. 11 CIV. 559 LTS JLC, 2012 WL 1027639, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2012).
126 See id. (“[A] Court must filter out the elements unique to the sound recording and
consider only the . . . compositional elements.”).
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Because of this interest in the actual fixed sounds, as opposed
to notes from a musical composition, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that
“even when a small part of a sound recording is sampled, the part [or
sound] taken is something of value.”127 Thus, sampling any portion of
a sound recording would constitute a “physical taking” of the interest
in the copyright holder, versus an intellectual taking, as would be for
musical composition copyright holders.128 The court found that no
matter the amount, if a creator of a sound recording sampled a portion
of another protected sound recording, to either “save cost or . . . add
something new to the new recording, or . . . both,”129 something of
value was lifted from the copyright holder’s interest. Therefore, only
an inquiry as to whether such sampling had, in fact, occurred needs to
be undertaken to establish infringement.130
Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the de minimis inquiry
is not appropriate to use in cases of sampling sound recordings based
on its interpretation of the 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), and, therefore, the court
determined that sound recording copyright holders and musical
composition copyright holders require different protections.131 This
decision governed the Sixth Circuit and remained unchallenged by any

127 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801-02 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“This analysis admittedly raises the question of why one should, without infringing, be able
to take three notes from a musical composition, for example, but not three notes by way of
sampling from a sound recording”).
128 See id. at 802.
129 Id.
130 See id.
131 Id. at 801-02.
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other appellate circuit court for 10 years,132 until the Ninth Circuit
decided to take a different approach when faced with the same issue.133
IV.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT RULING IN VGM AND ITS
CONSIDERATIONS

In VGM Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone,134 the Ninth Circuit
determined whether an alleged infringer who sampled from a
copyright protected sound recording could use a de minimis defense.135
132 Although unchallenged by another circuit court, the Bridgeport decision was strongly
criticized by many commenters. See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[2][b] (rev. ed. 2009) (“Indeed, had Bridgeport Music consulted Section
114’s legislative history instead of dismissing that history as irrelevant, it would have
discovered . . . [t]hat [an] excerpt [of legislative history] debunks the court’s imputation that
Congress, when adopting Section 114, intended to dispense with traditional notions of
substantial similarity. . . . Moreover, the very process by which Bridgeport Music expands the
rights of copyright owners through construing Section 114 rests on a misapprehension of the
statutory structure.”); 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PARTY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:61 (Sept. ed. 2018) (“A
disturbing, inexplicable departure from the de minimis non curat lex doctrine occurred in the
Sixth Circuit’s 2005 opinion in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films. . . . Other than
Bridgeport and the district courts following that decision, we are aware of no case that the de
minimis doctrine does not apply in a copyright infringement case.”); Jeffrey F. Kersting,
Singing A Different Tune: Was the Sixth Circuit Justified in Changing the Protection of Sound
Recordings in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 684-85
(2005) (“Finally, when statutory terms appear ambiguous, courts can generally turn to the
legislative history for some assistance. The Sixth Circuit did not address the legislative history
of the Sound Recording Act of 1971 or the Copyright Act of 1976 at all . . . . The arbitrary
nature of the substantial similarity and de minimis tests make them difficult to apply in
virtually any context, but this difficulty does not justify absolute abandonment of the tests in
this sub-group of [sound recording] cases.” (footnotes omitted)); Courtney Bartlett, Bridgeport
Music’s Two-Second Sample Rule Puts the Big Chill on the Music Industry, 15 DEPAUL-LCA
J. ART & ENT. L. 301, 324-26 (2005) (“While the Sixth Circuit’s decision provides increased
protection for copyright holders, its effect on the music industry could be damaging because
the creativity of musicians and producers might become increasingly discouraged . . . . The
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport Music has created another opportunity for a chilling
effect in rap music.”); John Schietinger, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: How the
Sixth Circuit Missed A Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 230 (2005)
(“The Sixth Circuit erred by crafting its bright-line rule and not permitting a de minimis
analysis. Three specific legal arguments illustrate why this was an error in the court’s opinion.
First, a de minimis analysis applies to copyright infringement cases in general. Second, neither
sampling case law nor the Copyright Act eliminates the de minimis analysis for infringement
cases involving the sound recording copyright. Third, failing to conduct the de minimis
analysis runs counter to the purposes of copyright law.” (footnotes omitted)).
133 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 888 (9th Cir. 2016) (Silverman, J.,
dissenting) (“[A]n on-point decision of the Sixth Circuit, a decision that has governed the
music industry in Nashville—’Music City’—and elsewhere for over a decade without causing
either the sky to fall in, or Congress to step in.”).
134 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).
135 Id. at 878.
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In the early 1980s, music producer, Shep Pettibone, one of the
defendants in the suit, recorded the song Ooh I love it (Love Break).136
The musical composition and sound recording licenses of Love Break
were subsequently acquired by the Plaintiff VGM Salsoul, LLC.137
Then, in the early 1990s, well-known pop star and co-defendant,
Madonna Loise Ciccone (commonly known as Madonna), released the
song Vogue that achieved great commercial success.138 The plaintiff
in the suit alleged that the producer of Vogue copied a 0.23 second
“segment of horns,” or what became known as a “horn hit” by the
court,139 from the Love Break song he had produced.140 However, the
plaintiff claimed that this appropriation of the horn hit from Love Break
into Vogue violated VGM’s copyright in Love Break because VGM
was the owner of the copyright to the sound recording.141 The district
court applied the de minimis analysis and concluded that even if the
defendants conceded the copying,142 “no reasonable audience would
find the sampled portions qualitatively or quantitively significant in
relation to the infringing work, nor would they recognize the
appropriation.”143 From this finding, the district court concluded that
the appropriation of the horn hit was not actionable and, thus, granted
summary judgement for the defendant.144
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the de minimis inquiry
was correctly applied in determining infringement for both copying of
a musical composition and sampling of a sound recording.145 As a
result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding of the lower court,
finding that the sampling of the horn hit was de minimis and not
136

Id. at 875.
Id.
138 Id. at 874.
139 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 874-76.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. CV 12-05967 BRO (CWx), 2013 WL 8600435,
at *12 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013), judgment entered No. CV 12-05967 BRO (CWx), 2013 WL
6983384 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016);
see also VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 877 (“Tony Shimkin has sworn that he, as Pettibone’s
personal assistant, helped with the creation of Vogue and that, in Shimkin’s presence,
Pettibone directed an engineer to introduce sounds from Love Break into the recording of
Vogue. Additionally, Plaintiff submitted reports from music experts who concluded that the
horn hits in Vogue were sampled from Love Break. . . . Plaintiff has demonstrated actual
copying.”).
143 VMG Salsoul, 2013 WL 8600435, at *12.
144 Id.
145 See generally VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 871.
137
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copyright infringement.146 Interpreting 17 U.S.C. § 114, the court
concluded that Congress intended to maintain the de minimis exception
for claims of infringement of sound recordings and found that the
copyright owner’s exclusive rights in a sound recording did not
necessarily extend to the making of another sound recording that used
the protected work in its creation.147 With this holding, the Ninth
Circuit took the “unusual step”148 of explicitly breaking with the only
other circuit that had made an on-point ruling of this very question, the
Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport.149
A.

The Ninth Circuit’s Rationale for the Application
of the Substantial Similarity Inquiry to Sound
Recordings

The concept of a substantial similarity inquiry for determining
copyright infringement was developed through common law.150
Congress and the Supreme Court have been silent as to how this
inquiry should be conducted,151 which has likely led to the different
versions.152 As stated by an author on the subject:
[T]he Copyright Act does not expressly reference the
substantial similarity inquiry, Congress is aware that
courts engage in the inquiry. Much of the legislative
discussion, however, is limited to just that—
recognizing that there is such a thing as the substantial
similarity inquiry. Congress has expressly deferred to
courts to continue developing the substantial similarity
inquiry.153

146

Id.
See id. at 884-85 (“Accordingly, even though it is true that, ‘if the recording consists
entirely of independent sounds, then the copyright does not extend to it,’ that statement does
not necessarily mean that ‘if the recording does not consist entirely of independent sounds,
then the copyright does extend to it.’”).
148 Id. at 886.
149 Id.; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
150
Godoy-Dalmau, supra note 104, at 241-43 (“Congress and the Supreme Court have been
silent on the matter, lower courts have largely been alone in developing tests to determine
exactly when a work is sufficiently quantitatively or qualitatively similar.”).
151 See Godoy-Dalmau, supra note 104, at 241-43.
152 See generally Godoy-Dalmau, supra note 104, at 241-43.
153 See Godoy-Dalmau, supra note 104, at 241-42.
147
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The Ninth Circuit in VGM used the ordinary observer, or average
audience, version of the substantial similarity test for its inquiry, just
as the district court had done.154 This Note does not take issue with
this longstanding inquiry155 but raises some questions about the Ninth
Circuit’s rationale.
The Ninth Circuit’s rationale for applying this test to sound
recordings is problematic. First, the Ninth Circuit said that only the
performer’s contributions in a sound recording are used for
determining copyright infringement, making no mention about the
producer’s contributions.156 Second, the precedent used by the Ninth
Circuit dealt with the de minimis doctrine regarding musical
compositions, not sound recordings.157 Last, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that the average audience test was the correct test because it
is the average audience or lay public that ultimately determines the
financial gains creators earn from their sound recordings.158
1.

Producer/Recorder Contributions

When determining a claim of infringement for a copyrighted
sound recording as part of the de minimis inquiry, the Ninth Circuit
said all that matters is “how the musicians played the notes.”159 This
statement is arguably erroneous because it ignores the recorder’s
performance. This distinction should not be taken lightly. As
indicated in the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976, the
elements of sound recordings can be very different from those of a
musical composition.160 As noted by Congress, it is not only the way
in which the underlying composition was performed that constitutes
the protectable parts of the sound recording, but also the contribution

154

VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2016).
See Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Where there is no direct
evidence of copying, a plaintiff may establish an inference of copying by showing (1) access
to the allegedly-infringed work by the defendant(s) and (2) a substantial similarity between
the two works at issue.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Nova Design Build, Inc.
v. Grace Hotels, LLC, 652 F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2011); Elements of Copyright Infringement
Claim—Substantial Similarity, 6A FED. PROC. FORMS § 17:71 (June ed. 2018).
156 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 879.
157 Id. at 877.
158 Id. at 881.
159 Id. at 879 (emphasis in original).
160 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5669.
155
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by the producer responsible for setting up the recording session.161 The
House Judiciary Committee went as far to say that
the copyrightable elements in a sound recording will
usually . . . involve “authorship” both on the part of the
performers . . . and on the part of the record producer .
. . there may be cases (for example, recording of
birdcalls, sounds of racing cars, et cetera) where only
the record producer’s contribution is copyrightable.162
Music producers can add a multitude of additional elements to
a sound recording that accompany the musician’s performance.163 It
should be noted that this very case came to the Ninth Circuit, not
because of how Madonna “played her notes,” but because of an idea
from her producer that the song needed something more.164 Thus, this
analysis is suspect because the Ninth Circuit began its inquiry without

161

See id.
See id. (emphasis added).
163 Rick Camp, What Does A Music Producer Do?, RECORDING CONNECTION,
https://www.recordingconnection.com/reference-library/recording-entrepreneurs/what-doesa-music-producer-do/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (“The music producer is in charge of either
writing the material or if he didn’t write it, he’s in charge of organizing it and making it sound
like a cohesive song. He calls all the shots on what’s played, and when it’s played, and how
it’s played, and the sounds that are used, or the vocals that are recorded if they’re correct or
not. The producer is in charge of everything.” (emphasis added)); see also New Old Music
Grp., Inc. v. Gottwald, 122 F. Supp. 3d 78, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“For this ‘improper
appropriation’ prong, ‘it is essential that the similarity relate to copyrightable material. . . .
When similar works resemble each other only in unprotected aspects . . . defendant prevails.’
Muller, 794 F.Supp.2d at 440 (quoting Bill Diodato Photography, LLC v. Kate Spade, LLC,
388 F.Supp.2d 382, 389-90 (S.D.N.Y.2005).”). Whether material is copyrightable depends on
whether the work is “original to the author.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 345 (1991). Originality, as the term is used in copyright, “means only that the work
was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.” Id. The “requisite level of creativity is
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.” Id. “Originality does not signify novelty;
a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity
is fortuitous, not the result of copying.” Id. As the Supreme Court has explained, if two poets,
“each ignorant of the other,” composed identical poems, each would be copyrightable since
they are both original, though neither is novel. Id. at 345-46.
164 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Pettibone directed
an engineer to introduce sounds from Love Break into the recording of Vogue.”); Id. at 87980 (“Pettibone copied one quarter-note of a four-note chord, lasting 0.23 seconds; he isolated
the horns by filtering out the other instruments playing at the same time; he transposed it to a
different key; he truncated it; and he added effects and other sounds to the chord itself.”); Id.
at 889 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (“The defendants wanted horns to punctuate their song, so
they took the plaintiff’s copyrighted recording of horns. The horn hit is brief, but clearly
perceptible and does its job.”).
162
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mentioning the copyrightable elements contributed by, not just the
performer, but the producer as well.
2.

Precedent Based on Musical Compositions

The Ninth Circuit in VGM, and the district court in Bridgeport,
relied on the Ninth Circuit case, Newton v. Diamond,165 which
involved the de minimis doctrine’s applicability in musical sampling
copyright disputes.166 The court in Newton decided whether the de
minimis doctrine could be used as a defense against a claim of alleged
infringement of a musical composition after legally sampling a portion
from a sound recording.167 The plaintiff, James Netwon, was a jazz
flutist and composer who composed the song “Choir” in 1978.168 In
1981, he subsequently preformed and recorded “Choir” and licensed
all rights in the sound recording to EMC records.169 The license only
covered the sound recording and Newton still retained all rights in the
musical composition. In 1992, the Beastie Boys, the defendants in the
suit, licensed from EMC records the rights to use portions of the sound
recording “Choir” in their song “Pass the Mic.”170 Newton filed suit,
arguing that the incorporation of the six-second, three-note segment
infringed his copyright in the composition because of the unique
performance elements used in conjunction with the composition.171
The court held that the performance elements were captured in the
sound recording but not the composition.172 However, because the
Beastie Boys had rights to the sound recording, its analysis could only
focus on the de minimis nature of the sampling as it pertained to the
musical composition.173
The district court granted summary judgment to the Beastie
Boys, holding that the three notes lacked sufficient originality to merit
165

388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004)
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 877; see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F.
Supp. 2d 830, 841 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004), republished as
modified on reh’g, 401 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2004), amended on reh’g, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir.
2005).
167 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193-94.
168 Id. at 1190-91.
169
Id. at 1191.
170 Id.
171 Id. (“First, Newton argues that the score contains an instruction that requires
overblowing the background C note that is played on the flute.”).
172 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1194.
173 Id.
166
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copyright protection and its use was de minimis.174 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, finding the Beastie Boys’ use of the three-note segment was
de minimis because the issue had to be determined solely on the
musical composition and not on the unique performance elements; “no
reasonable juror could find the sampled portion of the composition to
be a quantitatively or qualitatively significant portion of the
composition as a whole.”175
Because Newton dealt with sampling of a musical composition
versus a sound recording, the Sixth Circuit chose not to follow it in its
ruling in Bridgeport.176 The Sixth Circuit’s decision to depart from the
Ninth Circuit’s and other courts’ application of the de minimis inquiry
regarding musical compositions may have merit. In Newton, the
Beastie Boys legally acquired the license to sample the sound
recording.177 This fact stands in complete contrast to the issue
presented in Bridgeport, which dealt with the determination of whether
the sampling of a sound recording was considered infringement.178
The court in Newton made clear that the need to “filter out” the licensed
elements of sound recordings for its inquiry was paramount because
the sound recording was sampled legally.179 Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s
use of the Newton case is questionable as a basis for determining
infringement for the sampling of a sound recording because
infringement of a sound recording was not the issue argued. Thus,
because of the stark differences between the elements and interest of
musical compositions and sound recordings, the Sixth Circuit was

174

Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1194-97.
176 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802-03 n. 17 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“We have not addressed several of the cases frequently cited in music copyright cases because
in the main they involve infringement of the composition copyright and not the sound
recording copyright or were decided on other grounds. . . . We note that in Newton, the matter
at issue was infringement of the composition copyright. The alleged infringer had secured a
license for use of the sound recording.”).
177 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1190.
178 See Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 792.
179 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193-94 (“This case involves not only use of a composition, as was
the case in Fisher, but also use of a sound recording of a particular performance of that
composition. Because the defendants were authorized to use the sound recording, our inquiry
is confined to whether the unauthorized use of the composition itself was substantial enough
to sustain an infringement claim. Therefore, we may consider only Beastie Boys’
appropriation of the song’s compositional elements and must remove from consideration all
the elements unique to Newton’s performance. Stated another way, we must ‘filter out’ the
licensed elements of the sound recording to get down to the unlicensed elements of the
composition, as the composition is the sole basis for Newton’s infringement claim.”).
175
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justified in departing from these types of precedents that dealt with
musical composition sampling alone.
3.

The Lay Public Control

The Ninth Circuit said that, because an average audience or lay
public is the targeted audience for the potential financial returns for
creators of sound recordings, then an average audience is also the
appropriate audience to determine if copyright infringement has
occurred.180 Therefore, if an average audience cannot recognize the
appropriation, then there is no infringement because the copier has
“not benefitted from the original artist’s expressive content.”181 This
rationale is problematic because it does not take into account the
audience of the lucrative market selling and buying samples,182 an
oversight that could potentially have negative impacts on those
engaged in this market.183 The Ninth Circuit’s proclamation that the
only people in the market for sound recordings are the “lay public”184
reflects an error by the Ninth Circuit for failure to factor in the “hightech economy”185 of the sampling market, where the intended audience
180 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 881 (9th Cir. 2016) (mentioning the long
history of the test used in the general area of copyright law.).
181 Id.
182 Grant Rinder, The Drum Kit Market: How Producers Are Selling Sounds to Supplement
Income, PIGEONS & PLANES (Sept. 7, 2017), http://pigeonsandplanes.com/in-depth/2017/09/
producers-supplementing-income-selling-drum-kits (“‘I kind of caught the tail end of the
transition out of beat machines and into software. Back when I was coming up in hip-hop
production, there was this culture of sampling records, getting your drum sounds from the
crates, breaking up drum breaks, and all that stuff,’ says Illmind, who has worked with Kanye
West, Drake, and 50 Cent. ‘So one day I decide to compile a folder. I think it had 120 of my
own drum sounds. In my mind I’m like, “What would I pay for this? I should charge a couple
hundred bucks but I want it to be affordable and accessible,” so I set a price point of $20.’”).
183 See Di Cosmo, supra note 27, at 242 (“Yet another criticism of the substantial similarity
test is that its focus on similarity rather than harm is inconsistent with the purposes of copyright
law. The substantial similarity test, by focusing analysis entirely on the characteristics of the
defendant’s work, does not include any consideration of the harm that a defendant’s work may
do to the plaintiff.” (emphasis added)); see also Molly McGraw, Sound Sampling Protection
and Infringement in Today’s Music Industry, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 147, 164 (1989) (“In the
typical case, the trier of fact is instructed not to inquire into the value of the allegedly
appropriated portion standing alone, but rather into its importance to the effect of the
complaining song. The oft-quoted rule is ‘no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how
much of his work he did not pirate.’ Whether this rule will be imported into cases where the
‘complaining song’ is little more than a phrasing remains to be seen.” (footnotes omitted)).
184 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 881.
185 Jacob Goldstein, The Producer Who Created ‘Beat Kits’ Behind Today’s Pop Music,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO, INC. (Sept. 26, 2017, 4:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/26/553799
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is not the “lay public” but artists and music producers alike.186 As an
article on the subject noted, “[m]usic producers buy and sell musical
snippets to each other. They text each other half-finished beats.
There’s even a market for the sound of a single tap of a snare drum or
a single perfect yell.”187
Even though the lay audience does not pay for sampling per se,
defendants typically pay license fees or royalties to use sampling in
their sound recording, so plaintiffs are economically harmed when not
compensated for the sounds used without their authorization.188 Had
the Ninth Circuit taken this market into account, it may have
determined that producers and artists in the field versus an average
audience may have been the more appropriate audience for inquiry into
the sampling of sound recordings.189
Lastly, many scholars and other circuits have taken issue with
the substantial similarity or de minimis test beyond its application to
sound recordings.190 The substantial similarity inquiry is typically
used by courts to determine if there has been actual copying, absent
direct evidence of such.191 To infer that copying occurred, a plaintiff

207/the-producer-who-created-beat-kits-behind-todays-pop-music.
186 See id.; see also Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th
Cir. 2001) (referring to the substantial similarity test, stating “[i]n most cases, when a
copyrighted work will be directed at the public in general, the court need only apply a general
public formulation to the intended audience test. But when it is clear that the work is intended
for a more particular audience, the court’s inquiry must be focused upon the perspectives of
the persons who comprise that group” (citations omitted)).
187 Goldstein, supra note 185.
188 See Di Cosmo, supra note 27, at 242; see also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films, 410 F.3d 792, 804 (6th Cir. 2005).
189 Cf. Jamie Lund, Fixing Music Copyright, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 93 (2013) (“Both
computer code and musical compositions are in some way ‘blueprints’ for future expression.
Neither a computer code nor a musical composition is immediately accessible or marketed to
the layperson. This similarity would suggest that the layperson is not the intended audience
for a computer program or a musical composition. The best way to determine the value of
computer code and musical compositions, then, would be to ask the programmers and
musicians directly.”).
190 Godoy-Dalmau, supra note 104, at 249 (“Some scholars have argued for significant
procedural overhauls while others have argued for more focused substantive fixes.”).
191 See Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2009). (“Where there is no direct
evidence of copying, a plaintiff may establish an inference of copying by showing (1) access
to the allegedly-infringed work by the defendant(s) and (2) a substantial similarity between
the two works at issue.” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Nova Design Build, Inc. v.
Grace Hotels, LLC, 652 F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2011); Elements of Copyright Infringement
Claim—Substantial Similarity, 6A FED. PROC. FORMS § 17:71 (June ed. 2018); Amy B. Cohen,
Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 719, 735 (1987).
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must prove the defendant had access to the material and that the alleged
infringed work is substantially similar, as determined by an ordinary
observer.192 The Ninth Circuit in VGM did not use the test to determine
whether there was actually copying,193 but it used the same average
audience inquiry to determine whether the conceded appropriation was
recognizable to a lay audience; if not, then the copying could be
considered de minimis and not actionable.194 The Ninth Circuit may
have misapplied this test by using it for misappropriation instead of
actual copying. The former determining if the appropriated work rises
to the level of an infringement, the latter determining if in fact the work
was copied at all, notwithstanding the amount appropriated.195 As
noted by one author writing about the substantial similarity test and its
current use by the courts:
By relying on the concept of “substantial similarity” as
determined by an ordinary observer, [courts are]
confus[ing] the issue of copying with that of
misappropriation. The confusion of these two issues
had many undesirable consequences, as is shown by
examining the way more recent courts have used
“substantial similarity” in determining infringement.196
Based on this understanding, the Ninth Circuit may have fallen
victim to confusing copying and misappropriation.197 This confusion
192

Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A
plaintiff must show ‘copying’ of a protected work to prove copyright infringement. If there is
no direct evidence of copying, a plaintiff may prove this element through circumstantial
evidence that (1) the defendant had access to the copyrighted work prior to the creation of
defendant’s work and (2) there is substantial similarity of the general ideas and expression
between the copyrighted work and the defendant’s work.”). For information on the further
uses/versions of this test, see supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
193 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[F]or purposes of
summary judgment, Plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence (including direct evidence) to
create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether copying in fact occurred. Taking the facts
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has demonstrated actual copying.”).
194 Id. at 878-80.
195 See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
196 Cohen, supra note 191.
197 See Cohen, supra note 191; see also Di Cosmo, supra note 27, at 239-40 (“One of the
primary criticisms of the substantial similarity test is that it fails to properly account for the
basic concept of copying. Copying occurs where the defendant has used the plaintiff’s work
rather than creating a similar work independently or by using common public domain sources.
Traditionally, misappropriation has been defined as occurring where copying goes far enough
to constitute improper appropriation. The substantial similarity test essentially only considers
whether a work is similar to the copyrighted one—not whether it has actually been copied—
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may have led to an inquiry that is not the most appropriate test for the
sampling of sound recordings. In sampling cases where the
appropriation is already conceded by both parties, or must be, for
summary judgment,198 determining the substantial similarity between
two works is irrelevant. First, as argued, sampling creates a derivative
work and is the exclusive right of the copyright holder.199 Second, this
test is typically used for determining copying and not necessarily
misappropriation.200
Lastly, the First Circuit held, “de minimis copying is best
viewed not as a separate defense to copyright infringement but rather
as a statement regarding the strength of the plaintiff’s proof of
substantial similarity.”201 Thus, the reflexive application by the Ninth
Circuit may lead to works being labeled de minimis when, in fact,
infringement is occurring.
B.

The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of 17 U.S.C. §
114

After the Ninth Circuit’s de minimis inquiry, the court further
addressed statutory arguments made by VGM, premised on the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport.202 Based on the Bridgeport ruling,
the plaintiff argued that, even if the copied sample was found to be
trivial, it is irrelevant because the de minimis exception does not apply
to the infringement of copyrighted sound recordings.203 The court
rephrased the plaintiff’s argument, stating that the plaintiff asserted
that, “Congress intended to create a special rule for copyright sound
recordings, [by] eliminating the de minimis exception,”204 which the
and then finds misappropriation (and thus infringement) where the similarity is great enough
to arrive at some arbitrary level deemed by the court to be substantial.” (footnotes omitted)).
198 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 877.
199 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800-01 (6th Cir. 2005);
Howard, supra note 74.
200 See Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2009). (“Where there is no direct
evidence of copying, a plaintiff may establish an inference of copying by showing (1) access
to the allegedly-infringed work by the defendant(s) and (2) a substantial similarity between
the two works at issue.” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Nova Design Build, Inc. v.
Grace Hotels, LLC, 652 F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2011); Elements of Copyright Infringement
Claim—Substantial Similarity, 6A FED. PROC. FORMS § 17:71 (June ed. 2018); Cohen, supra
note 191.
201 Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP. Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009).
202 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 880.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 881 (emphasis added).
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court later equated to an “implicit expansion”205 of the rights of sound
recording copyright holders. The court refuted this argument based on
three major points. First, from a plain reading of the copyright statute,
Congress did not create a special rule for sound recordings as opposed
to the other works included in the statute.206 Second, the legislative
history of the statute does not create a special rule or exception for the
de minimis inquiry of sound recordings.207 Lastly, the court ultimately
rejected the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the copyright statute that
the plaintiff relied upon.208
1.

The Ninth Circuit’s Plain Meaning Analysis

The court started with a plain reading of 17 U.S.C. § 102209 and
explained why sound recordings were not treated differently than all
other types of protected works.210 The court determined that nothing
in the text suggested any differential treatment between a sound
recording and any of the other works listed.211 The Ninth Circuit
referred to 17 U.S.C. § 106212 and found that a plain reading of this

205
206
207
208
209

210
211
212

See id. at 881-83.
Id.
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883.
Id. at 884.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018), which provides:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 881-82.
Id.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018), which provides:
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section did not “suggest[] differential treatment of de minimis copying
of sound recordings,” as compared to other works.213
The Ninth Circuit then interpreted the plain meaning of 17
U.S.C § 114(b). This section states:
The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a
sound recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section
106 do not extend to the making or duplication of
another sound recording that consists entirely of an
independent fixation of other sounds, even though such
sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted
sound recording.214
The Ninth Circuit concluded that a straightforward reading of this
quoted sentence from § 114 revealed that Congress intended to limit
the rights of sound recording copyright holders because the statute
contained the words “do not extend” when speaking about the
exclusive rights given to copyright holders of sound recordings.215
However, the Ninth Circuit was particular in how it interpreted this
part of the statute. The court’s plain meaning reading of § 114(b) was
phrased as: “The exclusive rights of the owner of a copyright in a sound
recording . . . do not extend to the making or duplication of another

Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
213 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 882 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added); but cf. Griffin v. JRecords, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1142-43 (E.D. Wash. 2005) (“Copyright in a sound recording
does not give the same scope of exclusive rights as for other types of copyrighted works.”).
214 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
215 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883.
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sound recording [with certain qualities].”216
This articulation
suppresses and replaces words that are relevant to the Sixth Circuit’s
interpretation of the same section.
In its plain meaning analysis, the Ninth Circuit left out “clauses
(1) and (2) of § 106,” the latter dealing with derivative works.217
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit replaced the language after “sound
recording” from, “consists entirely of an independent fixation of other
sounds,” to “with certain qualities.”218 The court’s exclusion of
language that mentions the exclusive right to prepare derivative works,
and entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, raises
questions because that missing language is heavily relied upon by the
Sixth Circuit219 in its interpretation of the same section of the statute.
Instead of critiquing the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation head on,
the Ninth Circuit left out the language that supported the Sixth
Circuit’s position. As noted by the dissent, “it is the majority that
tortures the natural reading of these provisions. Bear in mind that §
114(b) simply explains the scope of exclusive rights already granted to
copyright holders under § 106. These two provisions must be read
together, as the Sixth Circuit did.”220 It is unknown why the Ninth
Circuit decided to frame the language of the statute in this manner.
When compared to the statute itself, these omissions and additions of
language critical to the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation raise serious
questions as to the Ninth Circuit’s plain meaning analysis of 17 U.S.C.
§ 114(b).
i.

Limits on the Rights of Sound
Recordings

The Ninth Circuit finished its plain meaning analysis by
discussing each instance of implied limiting language in the statute as
a basis to refute the Sixth Circuit’s Bridgeport ruling that, according
to the Ninth Circuit, implicitly expanded the rights of copyright

216 Id. (emphasis in original). See the language of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) above; this important
language is left out, and “certain qualities” are nowhere to be found in the statute.
217
17 U.S.C. § 114.
218 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883. It should be noted that the court never explained what
the certain qualities are.
219 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800-01 n.10 (6th Cir.
2005).
220 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 889-90 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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holders in sound recordings.221
The court said, “first sentence:
‘exclusive rights . . . do not extend’ to certain circumstances; second
sentence: ‘exclusive rights . . . do not extend’ to certain circumstances;
fourth sentence: ‘exclusive rights . . . do not apply’ in certain
circumstances.”222 After this enumeration, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that it is hard to find an “implicit expansion” of the rights provided by
this section when Congress has so many mentions of an “express
limitation” on the rights.223
First, uncertainty exists among the courts as to the scope of
“limits” envisioned by Congress. In Griffin v. J-Records,224 the
Eastern District of Washington described the limits of the exclusive
right on sound recordings much like the Sixth Circuit:
the exclusive right of reproduction is limited to the right
to duplicate the sounds in a form “that directly or
indirectly recaptures the actual sounds fixed in the
recording.” A sound recording copyright does not give
a right to prevent others from making an independent
fixation of sounds that “imitate or simulate” those in the
copyrighted sound recording. Thus, the remedy of the
owner of a sound recording copyright is largely limited
to proceeding against the tape or record “pirate” who
without permission makes a reproduction of the actual
sounds in a protected recording.225
This finding, that the copyright holder is limited to duplicate its own
actual sounds and limited to seek remedies from unlicensed persons
who reproduce the actual sounds, articulates an interpretation of the
extent of the restrictions on the exclusive rights of sound recordings.
This understanding by the Eastern District of Washington supports the
Sixth Circuit’s holding, that found that the statute limits the protections
of copyright holders of sound recordings to only the actual sounds
fixed. Which in turn, effectively limits copyright holders protections
and an ability to claim infringement against imitations of the sound
recording that are entirely independent of actual fixed sounds.226
221

See id. at 883.
Id.
223 See id.
224 Griffin v. J-Records, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (E.D. Wash. 2005).
225 Id. at 1142-43 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
226 In 2014 the District of New Jersey also discussed the “limits” of sound recordings and
found the Bridgeport interpretation to be correct. Zany Toys, LLC v. Pearl Enters., LLC, No.
222
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Further, the court’s interpretation disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation, which indicated that the limits to the copyright holder’s
protections in sound recordings might reach into the actual sounds
themselves.227 Thus, because ambiguity exists for what Congress
envisioned the “limit” in sound recording copyright would be, the
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion based merely in finding language in the
statute that indicates a limit on the right, without further context or
support as to what that the limit is, arguably makes the court’s
conclusion incomplete.
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s basis for believing that Congress
intended to limit protections for holders is grounded in the court’s
failure to find affirmative language supporting an expansion of
rights.228 This determination was premised on the conclusion that the
Sixth Circuit’s holding in Bridgeport, in effect, expanded the copyright
holders’ rights. The Ninth Circuit’s majority did not take account of
the fact that the Sixth Circuit merely explained what the right entails,
and not “expanding” a right, as discussed in the dissent.229 Thus, to
base its conclusion on a debatable premise aids an idea that the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning is incomplete and unpersuasive. Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit said that congressional intent can be found through the
legislative history, even if there is some ambiguity regarding the plain
meaning analysis of § 114(b).230

CIV.A. 13-5262 (JAP)(TJB), 2014 WL 2168415, at *11-12 (D.N.J. May 23, 2014) (“[T]he
Copyright Act confers more limited rights than to other types of copyrighted work. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 106, 114. . . . [T]he reproduction right is limited to the right to duplicate the sound
recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or indirectly recapture the actual
sounds fixed in the recording. . . . The exclusive rights of the owner of a copyright in a sound
recording . . . do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate
or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording. . . . Therefore, courts have found that
copyright protection for sound recordings extends only to duplications of such recordings, not
to imitations. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d at 800.” (first
alteration added) (emphasis added)).
227 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).
228 See id. at 883.
229 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005); VMG
Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 889 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (“That right was not invented by the Sixth
Circuit: it already exists in the statutes. And these statutes say nothing about the de minimis
exception.” (emphasis added)).
230 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883.
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The Ninth Circuit’s Legislative History
Analysis of 17 U.S.C. § 114

The Ninth Circuit’s legislative history scrutiny is based on two
quotes from H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476.231 The court largely used the
same methods for this analysis as it used for its plain meaning analysis.
The first passage of legislative history deals with its statutory structure
argument and says, “[t]he approach of the bill is to set forth the
copyright owner’s exclusive rights in broad terms in section 106, and
then to provide various limitations, qualifications, or exemptions in the
12 sections that follow. Thus, everything in section 106 . . . must be
read in conjunction with those provisions.”232 The court reasoned that
the language from the passage proved that Congress intended section
114 to limit the rights of copyright holders rather than “expand[] their
rights.”233 Still, under this presumption that the holding in Bridgeport
“expanded a right,” the Ninth Circuit came to its first legislative history
determination by scanning a congressional document that indicated
proof of Congress’s intent to limit a copyright holder’s protection.234
Again, there are competing versions of what Congress meant when it
used the word “limit” in the creation of the statute;235 the Ninth Circuit
merely finding the word “limit” used in the statute, absent any context
that supports limited protections on actual sounds, is again
unpersuasive.236
Moreover, in the report cited by the Ninth Circuit, the House
Judiciary Committee mentioned the limits envisioned for § 114(b):
Section 114(b) provides that the “exclusive right of the
owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause
(2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a
derivative work . . . actual sounds fixed in the sound
recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered
in sequence or quality.”237

231

Id. at 883-84.
Id. at 883 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976)).
233
See id. at 883-84.
234 See id.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 224-27.
236 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883-84.
237 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5721
(emphasis added).
232
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This section of the same congressional history comports with the Sixth
Circuit’s and Washington district court’s findings; the intent was to
limit claims against imitations or simulations of protected works.238
Thus, the passage quoted by the Ninth Circuit showed that Congress
intended to limit the rights of copyright holders in sound recordings;
however, it is still arguable that the limit was on the exclusive right to
prepare derivatives from the sound recordings that were not merely
imitations or simulations.239 Because uncertainty exists, this may
suggest that finding the word “limit” in the legislative history, alone,
is simply not enough to support the Ninth Circuit’s finding.
The second passage from H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 stated:
Subsection (b) of section 114 makes clear that statutory
protection for sound recordings extends only to the
particular sounds of which the recording consists and
would not prevent a separate recording of another
performance in which those sounds are imitated. Thus,
infringement takes place whenever all or any
substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make
up a copyrighted sound recording are reproduced in
phonorecords by repressing, transcribing, recapturing
off the air, or any other method, or by reproducing them
in the soundtrack or audio portion of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work. Mere imitation of a recorded
performance would not constitute a copyright
infringement even where one performer deliberately
sets out to simulate another’s performance as exactly as
possible.240
The court explained that the phrase “any substantial portion”
was dispositive language that proved that “Congress intended to
maintain the de minimis exception for copyrighted sound
recordings.”241 Although, on its face, this reasoning sounded logical,
238 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005); see
also Griffin v. J-Records, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1142-43 (E.D. Wash. 2005); Zany Toys, LLC
v. Pearl Enterprises, LLC, No. CIV.A. 13-5262 (JAP)(TJB), 2014 WL 2168415, at *11-12
(D.N.J. May 23, 2014).
239 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800; see also Griffin, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1142-43; Zany
Toys,, 2014 WL 2168415, at *11.
240 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883 (emphasis in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476,
at 106 (1976)).
241 Id. at 884.
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it could be argued that the legislature intended to discuss the fair use
defense versus the de minimis exception. This is because the phrase
“any substantial portion,” relied upon by the Ninth Circuit for
rationalizing Congress’s intent to keep the de minimis exception is
found, almost verbatim, directly in the language of the statute creating
the fair use doctrine: “[i]n determining whether the use made of a work
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include . . . (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole . . . .”242
Fair use was codified at the same time as copyright protections
for sound recordings. As a House Judiciary Committee member stated
in the same report cited above: “[t]he judicial doctrine of fair use, one
of the most important and well established limitations on the exclusive
right of copyright owners, would be given express statutory
recognition for the first time in section 107.”243 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis appears less convincing because Congress may have
been signaling fair use, instead of a de minimis exception, when it
mentioned the word “substantial” in its report. Therefore, courts
deciding which approach to follow for these types of cases should keep
in mind that the Sixth Circuit’s ruling leaves the possibility of the fair
use defense,244 which, as argued, may have been Congress’s intention
all along.
3.

The Ninth Circuit’s Critique of the
Bridgeport Holding

The Ninth Circuit continued its analysis of 17 U.S.C. § 114
with a critique of the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the same statute
in Bridgeport.245 The Ninth Circuit first reasoned that the Sixth
Circuit’s interpretation of § 114(b) must be rejected because it did not
consider the statutory structure and it ignored the “expressed
limitations.”246 However, as discussed above, the Ninth Circuit’s

242

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (emphasis added).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678
(emphasis added.).
244 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805 (“Since the district judge found no infringement, there was
no necessity to consider the affirmative defense of ‘fair use.’ On remand, the trial judge is
free to consider this defense and we express no opinion on its applicability to these facts.”).
245 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884.
246 Id.
243
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statutory structure “limit” theory raises issues of its own.247 The Ninth
Circuit’s methods, and the rationale for those methods, in both its plain
meaning and legislative history analysis, are arguably unsupported.
Thus, rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s claim solely because it did not take
the Ninth Circuit’s questionable approach is unpersuasive.
The Ninth Circuit then reasoned that the Sixth Circuit’s
analysis should be rejected because it did not take into account the
legislative history.248 The Sixth Circuit did not engage in a legislative
history analysis of sampling because digital sampling was not yet
created when Congress enacted the statute.249 Yet, the Sixth Circuit
did recount the history of the Copyright Act regarding its enactment to
combat piracy of sound recordings.250
The Ninth Circuit then explained that the Sixth Circuit’s
conclusion about the word “entirely” in the statute, and its legal effect,
should be rejected because it was based on a logical fallacy.251 The
court stated, “[a] statement that rights do not extend to a particular
circumstance does not automatically mean that the rights extend to all
other circumstances. In logical terms, it is a fallacy to infer the inverse
of a conditional from the conditional.”252 Just because one circuit
concludes that an argument may be a fallacy does not explicitly mean
that the argument is, in fact, incorrect; this assumption, itself, is

247

See supra notes 221-36 and accompanying text.
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884 (“We reject that interpretation of § 114(b). Bridgeport
ignored the statutory structure and § 114(b)’s express limitation on the rights of a copyright
holder. Bridgeport also declined to consider legislative history on the ground that ‘digital
sampling wasn’t being done in 1971.’” (citation omitted)).
249 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805.
250 Id. at 800.
251 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884; see also Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800-01 (“The
significance of this provision is amplified by the fact that the Copyright Act of 1976 added the
word ‘entirely’ to this language. Compare Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85
Stat. 391 (Oct. 15, 1971).”).
252 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884.
248
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actually a fallacy.253 Thus, as the dissent in VGM also concluded, this
argument should not be given too much weight.254
It must be reiterated that the Ninth Circuit, for reasons
unknown, during its interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), made no
mention of the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of the section on the exclusive
right to prepare a derivative work.255 If the Ninth Circuit had
mentioned this, then its ruling allowing for some forms of samplingwithout-permission, may have been difficult to reach. When a person
applies for a license of a sound recording, he must fill out a Form SR.256
If the sound recording he seeks to license contains a sample, thus, a
derivative work,257 the Form SR requires that he disclose “any
preexisting work or works that this work is based on or incorporates .
. . [and/or] a brief, general statement of the material that has been
added to this work and in which copyright is claimed.”258
Further, because the creator of this new work would have to
disclose any sampled portion he incorporated into his work, he would
either have to lie on the Form SR, thereby committing fraud, or advise
253

Fallacist’s Fallacy, LOGICAL FALLACIES, http://www.logicalfallacies.info/relevance/
fallacists/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (“The fallacist’s fallacy involves rejecting an idea as
false simply because the argument offered for it is fallacious. Having examined the case for a
particular point of view, and found it wanting, it can be tempting to conclude that the point of
view is false. This, however, would be to go beyond the evidence.”); Fallacy Fallacy,
FALLACY FILES, http://www.fallacyfiles.org/fallfall.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (“[T]he
Fallacy Fallacy is committed only when a conclusion is rejected as false because an argument
for it is fallacious, that is, commits a logical fallacy. Since a logical fallacy is a mistake in
reasoning that is common enough to be named, not just any bad argument will do.”).
254 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 888 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (“The majority chooses to
follow the views [i.e. the fallacy argument] of a popular treatise instead of an on-point decision
of the Sixth Circuit, a decision that has governed the music industry in Nashville—“Music
City.’”).
255 See generally id.
256 Form SR, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., Dec. 2016, https://www.copyright.gov/forms/form
sr.pdf (“Use Form SR for registration of published or unpublished sound recordings.”).
257 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800-01 (6th Cir. 2005);
Howard, supra note 74; Digital Sampling Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/d/digital-sampling/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (“Digital
sampling refers to a technique of taking a recorded passage from an already existing or
recorded musical, spoken or other work and then adding it into a new recording. It is referred
as a sample and is regularly used in a repetitive manner or backwards or in combination with
other sounds or samples. Even though the sample may be no longer recognizable, the new use
is an infringement of a right treating it as a derivative work. Permission is to be obtained for
use of the sample. The U.S. Copyright Act prohibits a person from copying the original artistic
work of another, without consent. If a person use [sic] a part of another’s work, even a very
small part, without the copyright owner’s consent, s/he is infringing the owner’s rights.”
(emphasis added)).
258 Form SR, supra note 256 (emphasis added).
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the copyright holder of what he sampled; if the holder believes he
should be compensated for such an appropriation, the creator of the
derivative work may be liable for infringement.259 Similar to the Sixth
Circuit’s holding, this reasoning implies that there can be no de
minimis inquiry for the sampling of sound recordings when the
sampling has been conceded to because any amount of a sampled
sound recording must be disclosed. Moreover, these required
disclosures could lend support to the idea that if a work is sampled,
regardless of the amount, something of value260 was lifted.
The Ninth Circuit then attacked the Sixth Circuit’s finding that
the sampling of a sound recording is a physical taking rather than an
intellectual one. First, the court compared its sampling case to a case
about a photograph used in a movie.261 It determined that, because the
possibility of a physical taking existed in the photograph case and a de
minimis inquiry applied, then it should also apply to its sampling
case.262 Second, the court stated that even if a different standard should
apply to sound recordings versus other works, “that theoretical
difference does not mean that Congress actually adopted a different
rule.”263 This argument does not take into account that the ruling in
Bridgeport was not the creation of a “new rule” or standard per se, but
rather the articulation of the right that was already created by
Congress.264
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s
analysis because copyright protection did not extend to the “fruit of the
[author’s] labor” because it premised its understanding of the harm
caused by physical takings of sound recordings on “merely saving
259 Willis, supra note 5, at 321 (“In Zacchini, the Court announced that publishing an artist’s
entire act constituted an act of infringement. However, the Court did not address the question
of partial publicity by another. Copyright owners of sound recordings are guaranteed the right
to publicity by section 114 of the Copyright Act of 1976. Any unauthorized public display of
a sound recording or musical composition should be considered an infringement. The display
of a de minimis taking is nonetheless a public offering of another person’s labor. Such an
offering is an act of infringement.” (emphasis added)).
260 Cf. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802.
261 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 885 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Sandoval v.
New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Because Sandoval’s photographs
appear fleetingly and are obscured, severely out of focus, and virtually unidentifiable, we find
the use of those photographs to be de minimis.”).
262 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885; see also Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 218.
263 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885.
264 Id. at 889 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (“That right was not invented by the Sixth Circuit:
it already exists in the statutes. And these statutes say nothing about the de minimis
exception.”).
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cost” to the creator by not having to hire musicians.265 This analysis
fails to take into account, again, that the value of a sound recording
sample is not based on the financial savings to a creator for not having
to hire musicians to make a new recording. Sound recording samples
are “a valuable property right, the stock-in-trade of artists who make
their living recoding music and selling records,”266 i.e., licensing and
royalty fees. This point was articulated in VGM’s dissent, when Judge
Silverman stated, “once the sound is fixed, it is tangible property
belonging to the copyright holder.”267 Thus, for the reasons discussed,
the Ninth Circuit’s critique of the Sixth Circuit’s approach to sampling
not only had problems of its own, it also failed to further its
determination as to why the Bridgeport finding should be rejected.
Lastly, another reason exists for rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s approach
besides its analysis. Adoption of the court’s approach to this issue
could also lead down a path to unanticipated complications for sound
recording copyright law.
V.

THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF DE MINIMIS SAMPLINGS

In regard to a slippery slope of the de minimis exception, the
court in Holmes v. Board of Review268 held that, “[r]uling that an item
is of such low value to be per se trivial would send the wrong message
which could be seen as an authorization to [steal] below that amount .
. . . [C]reat[ing] a de minimis [sic] exception . . . could similarly
encourage . . . theft of low-value items over extended periods of
time.”269 The courts may be “encouraging similar acts”270 by allowing
for the taking of low value or trivial parts from a sound recording if it
follows the Ninth Circuit holding, which could have unforeseen
negative implications for the music industry.
265

Id. at 885 (alteration in original).
See id. at 888 (Silverman, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 890 (Silverman, J., dissenting).
268 No. A-1420-15T1, 2017 WL 1056398 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 21, 2017). This
case was brought to the Superior court of New Jersey appellate division after an appeal by
Holmes who was denied unemployment benefits after his discharge. Id. at *1 “Holmes was
discharged for taking ten bottles of water over a period of approximately three years, resulting
in a loss of $16.90 for the retail store.” Id. The court affirmed the finding of the Board of
Review and denied the unemployment benefits because although the left was low in value, the
court did not want to create a de minimis exception for Holmes’ thievery, as it would
potentially set a bad precedent. Id.
269 Id. at *3.
270 Holmes, 2017 WL 1056398, at *3.
266
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After the VGM ruling, anyone could arguably sample
Madonna’s or VGM’s horn hit by incorporating it into his song without
fear of a lawsuit, as long as his jurisdiction allows for the de minimis
defense. Because those horn hits have already been considered de
minimis in the eyes of the Ninth Circuit, no infringement would occur
if re-sampled. Accordingly, once a sample has been labeled de minimis
by law, that sound recording would not be afforded protections for
either the original artist nor the sampler because this appropriation
would not be actionable. This trivial-sample is considered to be in the
public domain because anyone could sample that horn hit, and neither
Madonna nor VGM would have any right to compensation.
Thus, the “encouragement”271 that could possibly come for
courts creating de minimis exceptions for what they determine to be
trivial may, in fact, perpetuate a mentality for would-be infringers to
just roll the proverbial dice when deciding to sample another’s sound
recording because he could assert the de minimis defense. Samplers
could take their chances at unlicensed sampling and, if caught, claim
as a threshold matter that the appropriation is de minimis, fostering the
cliche: “it’s easier to ask forgiveness than it is to get permission.”
Moreover, if the de minimis exception is allowed for sampling,
and there is no limiting principle in place, what is to stop an artist from
creating an album on the premise that every song in the album has
some small insignificant or trivial piece of another copyrighted song
in it? Could an artist do so without concern of litigation because the
parts taken may be considered de minimis by law? A real-life example
shows that this fear has become a reality:
While some artists are still producing heavily-sampled
albums, it seems only those with the most obvious fair
use defense are confident enough to do so without a
license, perhaps recognizing the strength of their
defense and realizing record companies would rather
not risk setting bad precedent. The D.J. Gregg Gillis,
better known as Girl Talk, is perhaps the most notorious
sampler; he uses hundreds of small samples on a single
album, never licenses anything, generates tons of
publicity, and is never sued. As Gillis put it, with so
many samples, “[i]t would take you hundreds of hours
of work and hundreds of thousands of dollars to clear
271

See id.
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the rights to this album even if you wanted to.” Yet, Girl
Talk’s business is not without harm. Both iTunes and a
CD distributer refused to carry his most recent album,
Night Ripper, because of legal concerns.272
Here the excerpt explains that only an artist confident in a fair use
defense would dare sample without a license. Thus, if the courts allow
for another defense in addition to the fair use test, courts may run the
risk of encouraging more “Girl Talks” by labeling certain samples de
minimis, harping back to the principle established in Holmes.273
A.

Possible Solutions

The obvious solution to cure the circuit split is to follow the
ruling of the Sixth Circuit, which would not bar fair use274 in sampling
of sound recording disputes.275 If courts allowed only the fair use
defense in sampling cases, samplers would become more creative in
order to satisfy the fair use balancing test, which in turn would mean
that their work would differ more significantly than that of a plaintiff.
This could foster a robust environment for both copyright holders
making new works without fear of being sampled and samplers
working harder to ensure that their creation is a unique contribution to
272

Lieberman, supra note 2, at 128-29 (footnotes omitted).
Cf. Holmes, 2017 WL 1056398, at *3.
274 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (emphasis added) on fair use, which provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar
a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the
above factors.
275 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Since
the district judge found no infringement, there was no necessity to consider the affirmative
defense of ‘fair use.’ On remand, the trial judge is free to consider this defense and we express
no opinion on its applicability to these facts.”).
273
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society, which comports with Congress’s overall intent for creating the
copyright system in the United States.276
If Congress or the courts believe that a de minimis defense
should remain for sampling cases, they should use a new test, “the
removal test,”277 to better determine the substantiality of a sampling,
abandoning the current average audience test. The removal test would
still determine substantial similarity by way of an average audience but
with a significant change. The average audience would not be asked
to determine if it could tell the similarities between two works or parts
of a work but rather if it could discern an appropriation at all.278
Instead of trying to listen for the appropriation between the original
work and new work, the new work would have the alleged
appropriation removed, and then the factfinder would determine if she
hears a difference from the new work with the appropriation versus the
new work without it. If a person could easily discern the difference,
then the appropriation obviously added something of value to the
work, and, thus, is substantial and should be protected.
If this test had been applied in VGM, the court would have
listened to Madonna’s song first with the horn hits, and then without,
making the determination if the horn hits removal was “significant”
enough to be noticed. If the difference was noticeable, the
appropriation was substantial; if not, the appropriation would be
considered de minimis.279
Thus, if the courts do not follow the ruling of the Sixth Circuit
by adhering to a fair use defense, the courts that choose to apply the de
minimis analysis to sampling cases should consider implementing the
removal test.280 A determination of which option is best could only be
determined if courts begin using the test.

276

See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
The name for this test was conceived by the author of this Note.
278 See McGiverin, supra note 6, at 1736 n.77 (“As such, a line between substantial and de
minimis taking might be drawn by imagining what a given song would sound like without the
instrument in question. While the bass line of a reggae song, for instance, is only one of
several instruments, it is hard to imagine such a song without it. Its inclusion would then be
considered to constitute a substantial part of the recording of that song.”).
279 See McGiverin, supra note 6, at 1736 n.77.
280 The removal test could be used even if courts choose not to engage in a de minimis
inquiry, as it could serve as an alternative determination of infringement. Moreover, these
courts could also apply the fair use defense because not all samples will be considered de
minimis as a threshold matter.
277
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CONCLUSION

The Sixth Circuit’s discussion of the congressional intent from
the 1970s as background for its interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)281
was well reasoned because the need to curtail piracy in sound
recordings was prevalent at the time Congress amended the Copyright
Act. Additionally, the statistics provided have shown282 that this
problem seems only to be worsening. Using this history as additional
fodder for the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion, that even “small” sampling
should not be allowed because it allows for “small” infringements or
piracy,283 provides a rationale for this interpretation.
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute is
logically sound. Through its robust reading of the statute, it was able
to determine that Congress’s insertion of the word “entirely” into the
statute meant that it was trying to further define the exclusive right of
sound recordings by limiting copyright holders’ exclusive right to
derivative works that were not entirely independent of sounds used
from the holder’s sound recording. This reasoning led the court to
determine that a work containing a sample is a derivative work and is
not entirely independent of the copyright holder’s sounds, and as such,
a would-be sampler would need to get a license to create such a
work.284 Further, the Sixth Circuit found that the substantial similarity
test or inquiry was the wrong test to apply to cases involving the
sampling of sound recordings.285
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is full of rationales
and methods of analysis that raise many questions. First, the Ninth
Circuit’s reflexive approach to apply the same analysis to sound
recordings as it does with musical compositions is questionable286
without more considerations, such as the different interest in both types
of works and that sampling is the act of creating a derivative work.
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s plain meaning and legislative history
analysis of 17 U.S.C. § 114 used debatable rationales and methods.

281

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005).
See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
283
See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800 (“That leads us directly to the issue in this case. If you
cannot pirate the whole sound recording, can you ‘lift’ or ‘sample’ something less than the
whole. Our answer to that question is in the negative.”).
284 See generally id.
285 See generally id.
286 See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 878.
282
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Lastly, its rationale to reject on-point precedent287 was based on the
finding of a “fallacy” and an arguably questionable critique of the Sixth
Circuit’s findings. Thus, these reasons diminish VGM’s credibility as
a case that should be relied upon by other courts facing the same issue.
The possible effects that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling could have
on the music industry, such as the potential massive losses in revenue
for persons that buy and sell samples, and the advent of more infringers
such as “Girl Talk” emerging, must not be forgotten. By using a
solution mentioned in this Note, these situations may be curtailed.
Thus, the de minimis defense should be barred in cases that deal with
sampling copyrighted sound recordings or the removal test should be
adopted.

287

Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“The obligation
to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit. With
Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do society’s work if it eyed each issue
afresh in every case that raised it.”).
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